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PUFF, PUFF, TAX: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 280E
PENALIZES STATE-SANCTIONED MARIJUANA
COMPANIES AND UNDERMINES THE ABILITY-
TO-PAY PRINCIPLE
JOSEPH E. THOMAS*
I. HASHING IT OUT: AN INTRODUCTION
Picture this: you go into business selling floral arrangements.  You
rent a small storefront, hire employees, and advertise the store.  You
purchase flowers in bulk, and your employees prepare the flowers for the
retail floor.  The employees inspect the flowers and remove any they can-
not sell.  They trim the leaves, stems, and thorns, arrange bouquets, and
package them for sale.  Your business is a hit, and in one year your store
brings in $1 million in sales!  When you file your federal taxes, you ex-
clude the cost of the flowers and deduct rent, employee salaries, and ad-
vertising costs from the $1 million in sales and pay taxes on the remaining
balance.1
Now picture this: the following year, instead of floral arrangements,
you sell marijuana flower (legally, under state law, of course).2  Similarly,
you purchase the marijuana in bulk, and your employees inspect the mari-
juana and reject any unsuitable buds.  They trim the marijuana, package
it, and label it before it reaches the retail floor.  Your marijuana business is
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.F.A. in Acting, 2013, California Institute of the Arts.  I dedicate this Comment to
the memory of my mother, Joanne Thomas.  Thanks to Professor Jane Voegele,
Professor Leslie Book, and Professor Orli Oren-Kolbinger for their thoughtful
critiques.  Lastly, I would like to recognize my entire family for their unwavering
love.  And above all, thanks to God, without whom my existence would be fruitless.
1. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) reduced the corporate income
tax rate from 35% to 21%. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 343 (2017).  To avoid
double taxation of profits (i.e., once at the corporate level, and again when the
profit is distributed to shareholders), many businesses are structured as pass-
through entities, such as a limited liability company (LLC) or an S-Corp. See Form-
ing a Corporation, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-em-
ployed/forming-a-corporation [https://perma.cc/9WY6-799T] (last updated Mar.
12, 2021).  Pass-through entities avoid double taxation because income “passes
through” to the owner who reports it on their personal tax return. See generally
Topic No. 407 Business Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc407 [https://
perma.cc/3BJ9-2A2M] (last updated Mar. 5, 2021) (explaining various ways busi-
nesses may be taxed).  Addressing equitable concerns surrounding the tax rate
reduction for corporations, the TCJA also enacted a temporary 20% business de-
duction for qualifying pass-through entities. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at
205–24.
2. Marijuana flower, also commonly referred to as “buds,” are the part of the
marijuana plant people can smoke. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v.
Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 179 (2018).
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also a hit and brings in $1 million in sales.  When you file your taxes this
year, however, you may exclude only the cost of the marijuana from your
sales.  The ordinary and necessary business deductions you took last year
for rent, employee salaries, and advertising are disallowed by section 280E
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) because you “trafficked” marijuana.3
As a result, your tax bill is significantly higher than in the previous year.
To add insult to injury, you might not even have enough profit to pay
the taxes due.  Assume your cost for the marijuana was $300,000.  If the
cost to rent the storefront was $200,000, employee salaries totaled
$300,000, and advertising cost $100,000, you would have a $100,000
profit.4  But because section 280E disallows all of your deductions, you will
be taxed as if you had a $700,000 profit.5  Applying a 21% corporate in-
come tax rate, you would owe $147,000 in federal income tax that year.6
Having already paid your landlord, employees, and advertiser, your actual
$100,000 profit would fall $47,000 short, not including state income taxes
that your business would also owe.  Had you instead continued to sell
flower arrangements, you would be permitted to deduct your business ex-
penses and would owe only $21,000 in federal income tax.
Section 280E results in an oppressive tax burden that unfairly penal-
izes marijuana companies.  The provision certainly cuts against the long-
standing principle that income tax should coincide with a taxpayer’s
ability to pay, regardless of whether section 280E is a prohibited penalty.7
Such is the plight of marijuana companies which, on one hand, operate
legally under state law, and on the other hand, traffic in illegal controlled
substances under federal law.8
3. Section 280E provides:
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade
or business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) con-
sists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of sched-
ule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by
Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is
conducted.
I.R.C. § 280E (2018).
4. $1,000,000 (gross receipts) - $300,000 (cost of goods sold) - $200,000 (rent)
- $300,000 (salaries) - $100,000 (advertising) = $100,000 actual profit.
5. $1,000,000 (gross receipts) - $300,000 (cost of goods sold) = $700,000 taxa-
ble income when section 280E applies.
6. $700,000 (taxable income) x 21% (tax rate) = $147,000.  The 2017 TCJA
established a 21% flat income tax rate for corporations beginning in 2018. See
H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 343.  Prior to the TCJA, corporations were taxed at pro-
gressive rates, depending on their amount of gross income. See id. at 342–43.  The
highest corporate income tax rate in 2017, for instance, was 35%. See How Did the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Change Business Taxes?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-change-busi-
ness-taxes [https://perma.cc/57ZH-LQ9S] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
7. For a further discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, see infra notes 26–43
and accompanying text.
8. See Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., www.dea.gov/drug-
scheduling [https://perma.cc/ZF62-C5V4] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).  Marijuana
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Marijuana companies provide societal benefits, such as jobs and tax
revenue.9  Additionally, patients with chronic conditions rely on medical
marijuana to manage their symptoms.10  Congress should amend section
280E to exclude marijuana companies that operate legally under state law.
Otherwise, legitimate marijuana companies may be taxed out of business,
which would strengthen the illegal drug trade.  Part II of this Comment
provides background on federal income taxation and tax policy, including
the history of section 280E.  Part III discusses case law arising from two
marijuana dispensaries challenging section 280E.  Part IV critiques the
Tax Court’s holdings in favor of section 280E and Congress’s failure to
amend the outdated code section.  Lastly, Part V discusses how states and
citizens would be negatively impacted by the continued enforcement of
section 280E.
II. THAT’S GROW BIZ: A CANNABIS-INFUSED LESSON ON
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Con-
gress to “lay and collect taxes.”11  Additionally, the Sixteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived.”12  To calculate taxes due, a business owner be-
gins by computing the business’s gross receipts, which generally equals the
total amount the business received from sales.13  The business owner then
excludes the cost of goods sold from gross receipts to determine the busi-
ness’s gross income.14  Typically, business owners can subsequently deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses from gross income to arrive at
their taxable income.15  Lastly, the taxpayer multiplies taxable income by
appears as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act. See id.  Accord-
ing to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Schedule I drugs have a high poten-
tial for abuse and have no currently accepted medical use. See id.  Other Schedule
I drugs include heroin, LSD, ecstasy, and peyote. See id.
9. For a further discussion of the benefits marijuana companies provide in
communities where marijuana has been legalized, see infra notes 188–99 and ac-
companying text.
10. For a list of medical conditions that qualify for medical marijuana treat-
ment, see infra note 198 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (emphasis added).
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.993-6 (1977).  Gross receipts also include gross income
recognized from other sources, such as the furnishing of services, or the sale of any
property that is not part of the ordinary course of business. Id. § 1.993-6(a)(2).
For the purposes of this Comment, gross receipts will be defined as total income
received from sales.
14. See How to Compute Business Income, WOLTERS KLUWER, https://
www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/research-topics/managing-your-taxes/federal-taxes/
how-to-compute-business-income [https://perma.cc/YH3C-YH4W] (last visited
Mar. 31, 2021).
15. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2018) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carry-
ing on any trade or business . . . .”).
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the applicable tax rate to ascertain how much income tax is due.16  The
following is a discussion on the “ability-to-pay” tax principle that has
shaped the United States tax system, adjustments that businesses make to
gross income when determining their taxable income, and the history of
section 280E since its enactment.
A. Harvesting the Green: Congress’s Power to Tax
Before Congress can exercise its taxation powers, it must first con-
sider what constitutes “income.”17  Various policies and principles have
influenced the way Congress taxes income, but only the ability-to-pay prin-
ciple has withstood the test of time.18
1. What Exactly Is Income?
Congress’s Sixteenth Amendment authority to collect taxes on “in-
comes” has been the basis of numerous legal controversies.19  For exam-
ple, what qualifies as income?  Does having income require a finding that
the taxpayer realized gain or profit?  In Eisner v. Macomber,20 the Supreme
Court defined income as “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined.”21  In tax, gain is recognized to the extent that a
seller’s amount realized exceeds the seller’s adjusted basis in the property
sold.22  To illustrate: if A purchases a car for $5,000, A’s basis in the car is
$5,000.  If A then sells the car to B for $6,000, A’s amount realized is
$6,000, which exceeds A’s basis in the car by $1,000.  Therefore, A recog-
nizes a gain of $1,000.
Nearly three decades after Eisner, the Supreme Court held in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.23 that Eisner’s definition of income “was not
16. See How Do Federal Income Tax Rates Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-federal-income-tax-rates-work
[https://perma.cc/QDR4-F5GF] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (listing current and
historical federal income tax rates and brackets).
17. For a further discussion regarding the definition of “income,” see infra
Section II.A.1.
18. For a further discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, see infra Section
II.A.2.
19. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (determining whether
pro rata stock dividend could be taxed as “income” under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment); see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (determining
whether punitive damages awarded in lawsuit was income for tax purposes).
20. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
21. Id. at 207 (emphasis added) (quoting Stratton’s Indep., Ltd. v. Howbert,
231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
22. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2018).  Amount realized is the sum of any money
received plus the fair market value of any property received in an exchange of
property. Id. § 1001(b).  Basis, which is sometimes referred to as cost basis, is
equal to what the seller originally paid to obtain ownership of the property. Id.
§ 1012(a).  Basis can sometimes be adjusted upward or downward, however, the
mechanics of adjusted basis are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally id.
§ 1016.
23. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”24
The Court’s broadening of Eisner seems to give Congress unbridled power
to classify any income as gross income, yet, whether “gain” is an essential
ingredient of “income” is still up for debate.25
2. Ability-To-Pay Tax Principle
For over a century, policymakers have recognized that taxation
should correspond to a taxpayer’s ability to pay.26  The ability-to-pay prin-
ciple is a fundamental standard of equitable taxation, and it is reflected in
our progressive individual and corporate income tax system.27  A progres-
sive system taxes individuals on the amount of income they earn.28  As a
taxpayer’s income increases, they are taxed at a higher rate.29
Although no universally accepted measure of a taxpayer’s ability to
pay exists, a logical and objective approach considers the net income of
24. Id. at 431 (finding that a taxpayer could not escape paying income tax on
punitive damages award under Eisner).
25. See, e.g., N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65 (2019)
(determining whether section 280E’s total disallowance of deductions was uncon-
stitutional under the Sixteenth Amendment’s definition of “income” when busi-
ness was taxed in a year that it operated at a loss).  Although it is unclear what
exactly constitutes “income,” one matter that is well-settled is Congress’s power to
tax “illegal income.” See Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding illegal income is taxable when taxpayer has dominion and control).  Sec-
tion 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code broadly provides that “gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including . . . income derived
from business . . . [and] property . . . .”  I.R.C. § 61(a)(2)–(3).  “[G]ains from
illegal activities are just as taxable as gains from legal activities.” Wood, 863 F.2d at
419 (upholding that gain is taxable income when its recipient has actual dominion
and control over it).
26. See Harry Silverson, Earned Income and Ability to Pay, 3 TAX L. REV. 299, 299
(1948) (acknowledging ability to pay as “the fundament of justice in taxation”); see
also JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 94–95 (5th ed. 2017). But see
Alice G. Abreu, Tax 2018: Requiem for Ability to Pay, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 61, 88
(2018) (discussing how the TCJA abandoned the ability-to-pay principle).  The Re-
port of the House Ways and Means Committee for the Revenue Act of 1913 states:
“The tax upon incomes is levied according to ability to pay, and it would be diffi-
cult to devise a tax fairer . . . .”  Silverson, supra, at 299 n.3 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
63-5, at XXXVII (1913)).
27. See Are Federal Taxes Progressive?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/are-federal-taxes-progressive [https://
perma.cc/XKL2-QPLN] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).  Horizontal equity mandates
that individuals who have the same level of economic well-being should be taxed
equally. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 26, at 134.
28. See Are Federal Taxes Progressive?, supra note 27.  As of 2020, there are seven
income tax brackets for ordinary income (10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, and
37%). How Do Federal Income Tax Rates Work?, supra note 16.  Capital gain income is
taxed at different rates than ordinary income, but it is still a progressive tax. See
How Are Capital Gains Taxed?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
briefing-book/how-are-capital-gains-taxed [https://perma.cc/6Q6T-MHLQ] (last
visited Mar. 31, 2021).
29. See How Do Federal Income Tax Rates Work?, supra note 16.
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the taxpayer.30  Income represents an individual’s earning power, and net
income corresponds with how much income is at the taxpayer’s disposal
after “costs of subsistence” are deducted from gross income.31  Congress
would not accurately measure a taxpayer’s ability to pay if it instead mea-
sured taxes by the amount of property the taxpayer holds.32  Property is
often encumbered by debts, so the fair market value of property is a poor
indication of taxable capacity.33  For property ownership to fairly reflect
ability to pay, the taxing body would need to apply complicated adjust-
ments for each taxpayer.34  The administration of such a tax would be
impracticable.35  Likewise, a tax based on consumption alone (i.e., sales
tax) would inequitably favor upper income groups.36  Low-income groups
spend nearly all of their income to meet their basic needs, while upper
income groups comparatively spend a smaller proportion of their income
and are able to divert a considerable amount of their income to savings.37
Thus, low-income groups would bear a greater relative tax burden than
30. See Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243, 243 (1946) (“At-
tempts have been made to measure ability in terms of the pain or sacrifice caused
by taxation, others have resorted to such objective tests as net income, property, or
consumer expenditures . . . .”).
31. See generally STEPHAN F. WESTON, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION
179–83 (1903) (analyzing historical interpretations and characteristics of taxable
income).
32. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 250 (recognizing shortcomings in methods
of measuring taxable income).  In addition to income tax, some states also impose
ad valorem taxes on tangible personal property such as vehicles. See Garrett Wat-
son, States Should Continue to Reform Taxes on Tangible Personal Property, TAX FOUND.
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/tangible-personal-property-tax/
[https://perma.cc/9HJ3-AV7H] (providing overview of state taxes imposed on
personal property).  State and local taxation is beyond the scope of this Comment.
33. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 250 (summarizing complications with taxing
personal property).
34. See id. at 251 (considering administrative burden of federal tax on per-
sonal property).
35. See id.  For the past couple of decades, the severely underfunded IRS has
struggled to collect unpaid taxes, issue timely refunds, and perform adequate cus-
tomer service.  Sarah Skidmore Sell, Underfunded IRS Struggles to Send Refunds, An-
swer Calls, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
aad7a3baaf338272c157bae07668ed43 [https://perma.cc/LC6C-VRJ7].  The al-
ready overburdened IRS would likely experience great difficulty administering a
federal tax on personal property, let alone one with complex adjustments to satisfy
the ability-to-pay principle. See id.
36. Buehler, supra note 30, at 250.  A consumption tax does not tax returns
from capital investments, such as dividends or gains from the sale of stock. See Who
Bears the Burden of a National Retail Sales Tax?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/who-bears-burden-national-retail-sales-tax
[https://perma.cc/38HX-T9TJ] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (summarizing con-
sumption tax).  “[I]ncome from capital makes up a larger portion of the total in-
come of high-income households.” Id.  Thus, a tax system based purely on
consumption would unjustly benefit high-income households, while low-income
households would carry a disproportional tax burden. See id.
37. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 250.
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those in upper income groups.38  Indeed, the ability of an individual to
pay taxes can best be measured by net income from all sources after taking
into account the taxpayer’s economic obligations.39
Individuals and businesses are not entirely governed by the same tax
code provisions, so the ability-to-pay principle faces different considera-
tions when taxing business entities.40  In the case of corporate taxation,
where profits are taxed initially at the corporate level and again when divi-
dends are distributed to shareholders, taxation on the basis of profit alone
is inequitable.41  Instead, the rate of the corporation’s return would be a
more accurate and fair representation of its ability to pay.42  Taxation ac-
cording to rates of return, however, requires significantly more administra-
tive resources from both the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), and is therefore highly impracticable.43
B. Trimming the Buds: Tax Deductions and Exclusions
Businesses make numerous adjustments while “trimming” their gross
income to determine their taxable income.  In most instances, Congress
can exercise “legislative grace” to allow or deny deductions from gross in-
come.44  In contrast, deducting Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) is constitu-
tionally mandated and cannot be disallowed by Congress.45  The method
for calculating COGS differs between businesses that manufacture and
produce goods, and businesses that merely resell goods.46
38. See id.
39. See id. at 243–44 (concluding that net income is the most accurate mea-
sure of taxpayers’ ability to pay).  This Comment argues section 280E disregards
the ability-to-pay principle because by disallowing all deductions, it ignores net in-
come and instead taxes marijuana companies on an amount that more closely re-
sembles gross income. See supra Part I.  As illustrated by the hypothetical in Part I,
when a marijuana business is taxed on some measure of income other than net
income, the business might not have the ability to pay its taxes after meeting its
other economic obligations. See id.
40. See WESTON, supra note 31, at 284–85 (describing theories of equitable
taxation of corporations).
41. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 255–56 (acknowledging shortcomings of
ability-to-pay principle in corporate taxation).
42. See id. at 255.
43. See id. at 256 (acknowledging administrative burden of corporate tax
based on rate of return).  Unlike corporations, pass-through entities avoid ability-
to-pay inequity because the owner of a pass-through entity is taxed at the same
progressive income rates as individual wage earners.  For a further discussion
about ordinary income brackets, see supra note 28.  For a further discussion of the
taxation of pass-through entities, see supra note 1.
44. For a further discussion of Congress’s ability to allow or deny deductions,
see infra Section II.B.1.
45. For a further discussion of COGS, see infra Section II.B.2.
46. For a further discussion of various ways businesses calculate COGS, see
infra Section II.B.3.
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1. Ordinary and Necessary Business Deductions and Legislative Grace
Generally, taxpayers who carry on a trade or business may deduct or-
dinary and necessary business expenses from gross income under section
162 of the IRC.47  Common business expenses include employee salaries,
rental payments for retail or storage space, advertising, and travel ex-
penses.48  Even taxpayers who own and operate illegal enterprises may
take ordinary and necessary business deductions, unless specifically forbid-
den by statute.49  Absent a statute disallowing deductions, the Supreme
Court has prohibited section 162 deductions in circumstances where the
deductions would frustrate public policy.50  Additionally, a taxpayer can-
not deduct fines or penalties incurred by violating a federal or state stat-
ute.51  Congress eventually codified these public policy concerns in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.52  The amended section 162 forbids deductions
for illegal payments such as bribes or kickbacks, amounts paid to lobby
politicians, and payments of fines or penalties incurred from violating the
law.53
47. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2018).
48. See id. § 162(a)(1)–(3) (stating allowable business expenses).  IRS Sched-
ule C of Form 1040 is used by sole proprietors to report income or losses from
their business. See 2020 Instructions for Schedule C, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/instruc-
tions/i1040sc [https://perma.cc/R7LE-7UV3] (last updated Jan. 14, 2021).
Schedule C demonstrates the breadth of business expenses that are deductible
under section 162. See id.  Sole proprietors can deduct expenses of operating their
car or truck, contract labor, depletion, depreciation, costs of employee benefit pro-
grams, business insurance, professional fees charged by accountants and attorneys,
office supplies and postage, rented or leased equipment, incidental repairs and
maintenance, materials and supplies, certain taxes, travel and lodging expenses,
business meals, utilities, and salaries and wages. See id.  Section 280E prevents ma-
rijuana business owners from deducting any of these expenses. See I.R.C. § 280E.
To view the statutory language of section 280E, see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
49. See Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958) (allowing deduction of rent
and wages to an illegal gambling enterprise). But see N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 74 (2019) (holding under section 280E petitioner is
not entitled to deduct expenses for federally illegal medical marijuana business).
50. See Carrie F. Keller, Comment, The Implications of I.R.C. § 280E in Denying
Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense Deductions to Drug Traffickers, 47 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 157, 160 (2003) (describing the Supreme Court’s public policy doctrine in
disallowing deductions).
51. See id. at 160–61 (discussing Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S.
30, 34 (1958), which disallowed a trucking company’s deductions for traffic fines
incurred from driving overweight trucks).
52. See id. at 162 (“Although this amendment would coexist with the recog-
nized, judicially-created public policy exception, Congress also intended ‘its codi-
fied version of the public policy doctrine to completely occupy this area of the tax
law.’” (quoting Charles A. Boreck, The Public Policy Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need
for Consistency in Denying Deductions Arising from Illegal Activities, 22 U. BALT. L. REV.
45, 55–56 (1992))).
53. I.R.C. § 162(c), (e)–(f) (prohibiting deductions for payments of fines or
penalties).
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Notably, in the amended section 162 provisions, the denied deduc-
tions focus squarely on the illegality of the payment itself, completely ig-
noring the legality or illegality of the underlying business giving rise to the
payment.54  For example, an illegal brothel that pays a bribe to the local
sheriff is prohibited from deducting the cost of the bribe from its gross
income not because the brothel operates illegally, but because the bribe
itself is an illegal payment.55  Although the bribe is disallowed, the brothel
can still deduct other business expenses under section 162.56  Section
280E, on the other hand, disallows all deductions because of the underly-
ing illegality of the marijuana businesses; a stark contrast to section 162’s
statutory scheme.57
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[d]eductions are a matter
of grace and Congress can . . . disallow them as it chooses.”58  Moreover,
the Court seems to relinquish the matter entirely to Congress, saying that
if deductions must be disallowed, “Congress should do it.”59  But there are
differences of opinion as to how far Congress’s grace extends.60  In Davis
v. United States,61 the Second Circuit acknowledged Congress’s discretion
to grant or allow deductions, but distinguished a nondiscretionary class of
deductions that “are inherently necessary as a matter of computation to
arrive at income.”62  The Second Circuit viewed computationally necessary
deductions as non-discretionary, but supported Congress’s discretion with
regard to non-computational deductions,63 so long as Congress’s discre-
tion does not violate other constitutional provisions.
54. See Keller, supra note 50, at 163 (contrasting illegal payments with illegal
businesses).
55. See, e.g., Toner v. Comm’r, Nos. 10826-80, 13639-80, 1990 WL 154691, at
*6–7 (T.C. Oct. 17, 1990) (finding illegal massage parlor and prostitution opera-
tion was permitted to deduct necessary business expenses from gross income).
56. See id. (citing case where illegal business was allowed to deduct business
expenses).
57. Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carry-
ing on any trade or business . . . .”), with § 280E (“No deduction or credit shall be
allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business if such trade or business . . . consists of trafficking in con-
trolled substances . . . which is prohibited by Federal law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
58. Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
59. See id. at 29.
60. Compare Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 324–25 (2d Cir. 1937) (assert-
ing that deductions necessary for computing net income are not subject to Con-
gress’s discretion), with N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65,
70 (2019) (“Deductions from gross income do not turn on equitable considera-
tions; rather they are pure acts of legislative grace, the prudence of which is left to
Congress.”).
61. 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1937).
62. Id. at 324–25 (comparing computational deductions with purely gratui-
tous deductions).
63. See id. at 325 (declaring non-computational deductions such as state and
local taxes paid or personal exemptions for taxpayers and their dependents not
necessary to determine income).  The Second Circuit’s distinction in Davis played
9
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2. Cost of Goods Sold: An Exception to Legislative Grace
While deductions are a matter of legislative grace, Congress may not
prevent the exclusion of COGS from gross receipts.64  COGS is an account-
ing term that refers to the amount a business paid for the inventory it
sells.65  In the landmark decision of Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.,66 the Supreme
Court addressed the meaning of the word “income” in the context of a
manufacturer converting its capital assets to cash.67  The Court distin-
guished “capital” from “profit or income” and ruled that the return of
capital was not income.68  Therefore, when calculating gross profit, a busi-
ness owner must be permitted to exclude the cost of their inventory.69
3. Reseller or Producer: Different Ways Businesses Calculate COGS
Businesses generally use the same equation to calculate their taxable
income.70  But the methods used to calculate COGS can vary depending
on whether the business merely resells goods or whether the business pro-
an important role in Judge Gustafson’s dissenting opinion in Northern California
Small Business Assistants, Inc. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 77–90
(Gustafson, J., dissenting).  The majority brushed the Davis distinction off as dicta
and refused to apply it to section 280E’s disallowance of all deductions. See infra
Section III.B.
64. See Joseph W. Blackburn, Fragmenting Cost of Goods Sold for Accounting Accu-
racy and Tax Profits, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 295, 300 (1987) (explaining that exclusion
of COGS from gross receipts is constitutionally mandated).
65. Diana Novak Jones, How 280E Became the Pot Industry’s Boogeyman, LAW360
(Oct. 18, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/
1209206/how-280e-became-the-pot-industry-s-boogeyman [https://perma.cc/
D8EY-3LHS].
66. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
67. See id. at 184–85 (analyzing differences between return of capital and in-
come).  The plaintiff in Doyle was a lumber manufacturer that acquired timber
lands for approximately $20 per acre in 1903. Id. at 181.  By 1908, the market
value of the land had increased to $40. Id.  The plaintiff was subject to the Corpo-
rate Excise Tax Act of 1909, which placed a 1% tax upon a corporation’s net in-
come in excess of $5,000 from all sources derived. Id. at 181–82.  The plaintiff
calculated its net income as the difference between the original cost of the timber
and the sum it received from selling the timber. Id. at 181.  The IRS insisted that
the plaintiff include the entire sum received for the timber as income for the pur-
poses of the Act. Id. at 184.
68. Id. at 183–85.  Instead of including the entire amount received in gross
income and later deducting the cost of the timber, the Court held that the cost of
the timber should be excluded from the outset, before gross income is calculated.
See id. at 185.  The Court observed that the same result is obtained through either
method, but the case importantly distinguishes the exclusion of cost of goods sold,
which is constitutionally mandated, from other deductible expenses, which may be
subject to legislative grace. See id. at 187–88.
69. See Blackburn, supra note 64, at 299 (restating holding of Doyle).
70. See id. at 300 (“Retail merchants generally compute taxable income as fol-
lows: Gross Sales (less) Cost of Goods Sold (equals) Gross Profit; Gross Profit
(plus) Other Income (equals) Gross Income; and Gross Income (less) Deductions
(equals) Taxable Income.”).
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duces and manufactures goods.71  COGS is determined using a three-vari-
able formula: beginning inventories plus current-year purchases (in the
case of a reseller) or current-year production costs (in the case of a pro-
ducer) less ending inventories.72
Marijuana resellers include the invoice price of marijuana in their
COGS, less any discounts, plus any necessary costs of acquiring the mari-
juana (i.e., transportation).73  Marijuana producers calculate COGS more
expansively using a different subsection of the tax code than resellers.74  A
marijuana producer’s COGS includes the cost of direct materials (i.e., ma-
rijuana plants or seeds), direct labor costs (i.e., planting, cultivating, har-
vesting), plus certain indirect production costs (i.e., utilities, rent, tools
and equipment not capitalized, costs of quality control, and inspection).75
Under current Treasury regulations, producers may also include some
other costs in COGS if they appear on the business’s GAAP financial
statements.76
C. Take a Hit: The Added Strain of Section 280E
In the early 1980s, the United States Tax Court held that a drug
dealer could deduct expenses related to a drug business, which prompted
Congress to enact section 280E.77  As states began to legalize marijuana,
marijuana companies petitioned the courts to limit the application of sec-
tion 280E.78
71. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(b) (as amended in 2018) (referring to mer-
chandise purchased by a reseller), with § 1.471-3(c) (referring to merchandise pro-
duced by a manufacturer).
72. See Ronald Marcuson et al., The Evolving Taxation of the Marijuana Industry,
95 TAXES 7, 8 (2017).
73. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(b).
74. Compare id. (discussing cost for merchandise purchased), with Treas. Reg.
§ 1.471-3(c) (discussing cost for merchandise produced).
75. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(c); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(i) (as
amended in 1993) (stating indirect production costs included in inventoriable
costs).
76. See Marcuson et al., supra note 72, at 10 (describing benefits of producing
GAAP financial statements); see also Treas. Reg. §1.471-11(c)(2)(iii) (as amended
in 1993) (listing inventoriable costs).  Costs pertinent to marijuana companies
under Reg. §1.471-11(c)(2)(iii) include spoilage, administrative expenses related
to production, and insurance costs related to production. See Tres. Reg. § 1.471-
11(c)(2)(iii). GAAP, which stands for “generally accepted accounting principles,”
are accounting standards companies use to prepare their financial statements. US
GAAP: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, CFA INST., https://
www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/issues/gaap [https://perma.cc/YP58-PX3R]
(last visited Mar. 31, 2021).  GAAP ensures that financial reporting is consistent
from one organization to another. Id.
77. For a further discussion and analysis of the legislative history of section
280E, see infra Section II.C.1.
78. For a further discussion of cases challenging section 280E, see infra Sec-
tion II.C.2.
11
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1. Edmondson v. Commissioner—The Case That Sparked Section 280E
and Its Repercussions on the Marijuana Industry
One year before Congress enacted section 280E, the United States
Tax Court decided Edmondson v. Commissioner.79  Lacking an express statu-
tory denial to the contrary, the court’s holding permitted the petitioner, a
drug dealer, to deduct numerous “ordinary and necessary” expenses asso-
ciated with dealing amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana under section
162.80  The petitioner was able to exclude $105,300 for the COGS and
deducted business expenses, which included the purchase of a small scale,
packaging expenses, phone expenses, car expenses, and one-third of the
rental expense for the petitioner’s home, where they primarily sold the
drugs.81
Congress responded to Edmondson by enacting section 280E under
the Tax Equity and Responsibility Act of 1982.82  Section 280E provides:
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise
such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled sub-
stances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Con-
trolled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the
law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.83
Congress enacted section 280E amidst the notoriously unsuccessful war on
drugs.84  The legislative history of section 280E reveals Congress consid-
ered public policy in light of America’s renewed anti-drug stance of the
’70s and ’80s.85  Congress anticipated constitutional challenges to section
79. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533 (1981).
80. See id. (holding deductions associated with drug dealing business deducti-
ble).  For a discussion of section 162, see supra notes 47–59 and accompanying
text.
81. See Edmondson, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1533 (listing various expenses that
petitioner was entitled to deduct).
82. David Bronfein, Comment, Maryland State Bank: The Responsible Solution for
Fostering the Growth of Maryland’s Medical Cannabis Program, 47 U. BALT. L.F. 28, 34
(2016).
83. I.R.C. § 280E (2018) (denying deductions for drug trafficking); see also S.
REP. NO. 97-494, at 309 (1982) (reporting changes to law in order to prevent drug
dealers from deducting business expenses from gross income).
84. See Michael Nabeel Alsharaiha, Comment, Smoking out the Criminals: How
Federal Tax Policy Can Reduce Illegal Drug Crime by Supporting the Legal Marijuana In-
dustry, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 319, 324 (2017) (highlighting Congress’s attempts to
deter drug supply through section 280E).
85. See S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309.
There is a sharply defined public policy against drug dealing.  To allow
drug dealers the benefit of business expense deductions at the same time
that the U.S. and its citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such
persons is not compelled by the fact that such deductions are allowed to
other, legal, enterprises.  Such deductions must be disallowed on public
policy grounds.
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280E, and the Senate Finance Committee Report preemptively explained
that “the adjustment to gross receipts with respect to effective costs of
goods sold is not affected by this provision of the bill.”86  Consequently,
marijuana companies have the unencumbered right to deduct COGS, but
all other deductions and credits are prohibited under section 280E.87
2. Early Challenges to Section 280E in State-Legalized Marijuana Markets
One of the earliest challenges to section 280E, Californians Helping to
Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v. Commissioner (CHAMP),88 was argued
before the United States Tax Court by “CHAMP,” a caregiving facility that
provided medical marijuana to its members legally under state law.89
CHAMP operated a community center where members with debilitating
diseases such as AIDS, cancer, and multiple sclerosis could receive caregiv-
ing services.90  In addition to caregiving services, CHAMP also provided
medical marijuana to members whose doctors recommended it as part of
therapy.91
The IRS disallowed all of CHAMP’s deductions, claiming they were
incurred in connection with the illegal sale of drugs.92  CHAMP argued it
engaged in two trades or businesses, and only the expenses related to its
secondary business of supplying medical marijuana to its members should
Id.  Between the presidential terms of Richard Nixon and Barack Obama, the fed-
eral government has allocated over $1 trillion to the war on drugs. See Alsharaiha,
supra note 84, at 324 n.46 (illustrating costs of the war on drugs).
86. See S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309.  In other words, the cost of goods sold
exclusion that was mandated by the Supreme Court in Doyle is unchanged by sec-
tion 280E. See id.; see also supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (describing
mandatory nature of COGS exclusions).
87. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text explaining section 280E’s
differential application to marijuana companies.
88. 128 T.C. 173 (2007).
89. See id. at 174–75.  California Proposition 215, also known as the Compas-
sionate Use Act, was passed in 1996, making California the first state to permit
patients and caregivers to possess medicinal marijuana. See California Proposition
215, the Medical Marijuana Initiative, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Califor-
nia_Proposition_215,_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996) [https://
perma.cc/5CZD-DYTP] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
90. See CHAMP, 128 T.C. at 174.  CHAMP’s extensive caregiving services in-
cluded various support group sessions, daily lunches for low-income members, hy-
giene supplies, one-on-one counseling with social workers, masseuse services, social
events, field trips, yoga classes, and more. Id. at 175–76.
91. Id. at 174–75.  CHAMP charged a membership fee, which covered both
the cost of caregiving services and the medical marijuana. Id. at 175.  Members
were provided a fixed amount of medical marijuana and were not entitled to un-
limited supplies. Id. at 176.
92. See id. at 177.  The disallowed deductions, which totaled $212,958, in-
cluded employee salaries, repairs and maintenance, rents, payroll taxes, deprecia-
tion of property, advertising, employee health insurance plan, accountant fees,
property insurance, office expenses, telephone services, and several other ex-
penses. Id. at 178–80.
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be disallowed under section 280E.93  The Tax Court agreed, finding that
section 280E does not intend to deny all of a taxpayer’s business deduc-
tions when some expenses are attributable to a trade or business other
than the illegal trafficking in controlled substances.94  The court held
CHAMP’s characterization of caregiving services and medical marijuana
distribution as separate business activities was not artificial or unreasona-
ble.  It apportioned CHAMP’s overall expenses and permitted CHAMP to
deduct expenses attributable to its caregiving services.95
Years later, another California dispensary attempted to claim separate
trades or businesses under CHAMP, but was rejected by both the Tax
Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.96  The petitioner in Olive v.
Commissioner97 operated the Vapor Room, a dispensary that sold medical
marijuana and also regularly provided complimentary on-site activities and
amenities such as yoga classes, chair massages, movie screenings, snacks,
and beverages.98  The IRS precluded the petitioner from deducting its
businesses expenses under section 280E.99  The petitioner argued that the
Vapor Room provided substantial caregiving services, and it should be per-
mitted to deduct the business expenses incurred for the on-site
activities.100
The Tax Court distinguished the Vapor Room from CHAMP, noting
that seventy-two percent of CHAMP’s employees worked exclusively in the
caregiving practice, whereas the Vapor Room employees’ responsibilities
spanned both sides of the business.101  The court rejected the petitioner’s
93. See id. at 180.
94. See id. at 181–82 (finding that section 280E does not prohibit deductions
for separate non-marijuana business).  For a further discussion of section 280E’s
legislative history, see supra notes 85–86 and the accompanying text.
95. See CHAMP, 128 T.C. at 183–85 (approving CHAMP’s two separate trades
or businesses).  The court allocated expenses on the basis of the number of
CHAMP’s employees who exclusively provided caregiving services and the portion
of CHAMP’s facilities devoted to each activity. See id. at 185.  Eighteen of
CHAMP’s twenty-five employees worked exclusively as caregivers. Id.  Additionally,
CHAMP dispensed medical marijuana at only one of three facilities that it oper-
ated. Id.
96. See Olive v. Comm’r, 792 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting recog-
nition as separate trades or businesses). See generally Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19,
42 (2012) (same), aff’d, 792 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2015).
97. 139 T.C. 19 (2012).
98. Id. at 23–24 (describing petitioner’s business model).  The petitioner did
not collect a fee to participate in the Vapor Room’s activities or services. Id. at 22.
Patrons were also allowed to use the Vapor Room’s marijuana vaporizers, regard-
less of whether they purchased medical marijuana from the Vapor Room. Id. at
23–34.  A vaporizer extracts the active component from the marijuana and allows
the user to inhale vapor instead of smoke. Id. at 21 n.5.
99. Id. at 36–37.
100. See id. at 38–39 (detailing petitioner’s arguments in seeking application
of CHAMP to their business).
101. See id. at 40 (comparing CHAMP’s and Vapor Room’s employees’ du-
ties).  The court even compared the names of the two organizations. Id.  “ ‘Califor-
nians Helping To Alleviate Medical Problems,’ stresses the dispensary’s caregiving
14
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claim that the on-site activities constituted a separate trade or business and
explained that “to be engaged in a trade or business . . . the taxpayer’s
primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or
profit.”102  Here, the Vapor Room’s only source of revenue was from the
sale of medical marijuana; the additional services and activities were
merely incidental to its main business of selling marijuana.103  The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that the only “business” the peti-
tioner engaged in was selling medical marijuana.104
Unlike CHAMP and Olive, which sought to merely carve out excep-
tions to section 280E, Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United States105 at-
tempted to overturn section 280E altogether.106  The plaintiffs in
Alpenglow owned a Colorado medical marijuana dispensary that was
formed as a pass-through entity, meaning Alpenglow’s income tax liabili-
ties “passed through” to the owners’ personal tax returns.107  When the
IRS disallowed Alpenglow’s deductions under section 280E and issued a
notice of deficiency, the owners paid the increased tax liability under pro-
test and filed claims for a refund, which the IRS denied.108  Alpenglow
argued that to calculate taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment,
ordinary and necessary business expenses must, in the same vein as COGS,
mission.  The name of the dispensary here, ‘The Vapor Room Herbal Center,’
stresses the sale and consumption (through vaporization) of marijuana.” Id.
102. Id. at 41.
103. See id. at 42 (finding petitioner ineligible for separate trade or business
treatment).  “The Vapor Room did not spawn a second business simply by occa-
sionally providing the patrons with snacks, a massage, or a movie . . . .” Id.
104. See Olive v. Comm’r, 792 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2015).  The Ninth
Circuit offered an analogy to illustrate the difference between the Vapor Room, a
single trade or business that offered free amenities, and CHAMP, an organization
that consisted of two separate trades or businesses:
Bookstore A sells books.  It also provides some complimentary amenities:
Patrons can sit in comfortable seating areas while considering whether to
buy a book; they can drink coffee or tea and eat cookies, all of which the
bookstore offers at no charge; they can obtain advice from the staff about
new authors, book clubs, community events, and the like . . .  The “trade
or business” of Bookstore A “consists of” selling books.  Its many ameni-
ties do not alter that conclusion . . .  By contrast, Bookstore B sells books
but also sells coffee and pastries, which customers can consume in a cafe-
like seating area.  Bookstore B has two “trade[s] or business[es],” one of
which “consists of” selling books and the other of which “consists of” sell-
ing food and beverages.
Id. at 1150 (third and fourth alterations in original).
105. 894 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2018).
106. Compare Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v.
Comm’r (CHAMP), 128 T.C. 173, 180 (2007) (seeking partial exception from sec-
tion 280E by establishing caregiving and medical marijuana as separate trades or
businesses), and Olive, 139 T.C. 19, 38–39 (2012) (seeking recognition as separate
trade or business under CHAMP), with Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1192 (seeking repeal
of section 280E for constitutional violations).
107. Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1193.  For a further discussion of pass-through en-
tities and how they are distinct from corporations, see supra note 1.
108. Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1193.
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be treated as exclusions from gross income, as opposed to deductions, which
is how the Tax Code categorizes business expenses.109  Alpenglow also as-
serted that section 280E results in an excessive fine in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.110
While the court acknowledged similarities between expenses that are
included in COGS and other ordinary and necessary business expenses, it
distinguished the two from one another.111  The court explained that
COGS “relates to [the] acquisition or creation of the taxpayer’s product,
while ordinary and necessary business expenses are those incurred in the
operation of day-to-day business activities.”112  Citing precedent from the
Supreme Court, the court maintained that Congress has discretion to al-
low or deny deductions.113  Regarding Alpenglow’s Eighth Amendment
claim, the court found that Alpenglow lacked evidentiary support for the
public policy arguments it attempted to raise in its amended complaint to
the district court.114  The court concluded that section 280E did not vio-
late the Sixteenth or Eighth Amendments.115
III. HIGH STAKES: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO SECTION 280E
No marijuana company has had success disputing section 280E, ex-
cept for CHAMP.116  Despite this dismal track record, two California mari-
juana dispensaries recently challenged sizable IRS tax deficiency
notices.117  First, the petitioner in Patients Mutual Assistance Collective Corp.
109. See id. at 1198.
110. See id. at 1202.  Alpenglow failed to include its Eighth Amendment claim
in its original complaint to the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado. Id. at 1205.  When Alpenglow attempted to amend its complaint to include
the Eighth Amendment claim, the District Court denied the motion, holding the
Eighth Amendment claim was not plausible. See id.  The Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits the imposition of excessive fines. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
111. See Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1199 (drawing distinction between COGS and
ordinary and necessary business expenses).
112. Id. at 1200.
113. See id. at 1201.  For a further discussion of “legislative grace” and Con-
gress’s power with regard to deductions, see supra notes 58–63 and accompanying
text.
114. See Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1205.
115. Id. at 1206.
116. See Vince Sliwoski, Why We Love the Harborside IRC § 280E Appeal, CANNA
L. BLOG (June 10, 2020), https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/why-we-love-
the-harborside-irc-§280e-appeal [https://perma.cc/2MXP-R29A] (discussing re-
cent challenge to section 280E on appeal before the Ninth Circuit in Harborside v.
Commissioner).  The Ninth Circuit recently rejected Harborside’s appeal of an unfa-
vorable Tax Court decision regarding section 280E’s applicability. See Patients
Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 19-73078,
2021 WL 1570288 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2021).
117. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 66 (2019)
(challenging $1.2 million income tax deficiency); Patients Mut. Assistance Collec-
tive Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 184 (2018) (challenging nearly $11 million
income tax deficiency).
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v. Commissioner118 argued section 280E’s qualifying language excluded the
company from its scope.  The petitioner contended it was a producer,
rather than a reseller, and it should have the ability to include certain
indirect costs in its COGS calculation.119  Second, the petitioner in North-
ern California Small Business Assistants v. Commissioner120 challenged the
constitutionality of section 280E under the Eighth Amendment.121
A. Patients Mutual Assistance Collective Corp. v. Commissioner
The petitioner, Harborside Health Center, is one of the largest mari-
juana dispensaries in the world.122  In compliance with California law,
Harborside operates as a nonprofit,123 but for federal tax purposes, it files
tax returns as a C corporation.124  The IRS audited Harborside’s tax re-
turns from 2007 to 2012, disallowed its deductions under section 280E,
and issued notices of deficiency that alleged over $10 million in penalties
and deficiencies.125  Harborside argued that section 280E should not pre-
118. 151 T.C. 176 (2018).
119. Id. at 188.
120. 153 T.C. 65 (2019).
121. Id. at 66 (discussing petitioner’s argument that section 280E as-applied
results in excessive fines).
122. See About Harborside, HARBORSIDE, https://shopharborside.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/T7DL-FFAG] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).  Founded in 2006,
Harborside currently operates four retail locations throughout California as well as
a forty-seven-acre farm in Monterey County. Id.  Notably, Harborside has more
than 250,000 registered customers. Id.  After California voters adopted Proposi-
tion 64, which made recreational marijuana legal under California law, Steve De-
Angelo, one of Harborside’s founders, marked the historic event by selling the first
gram of legal cannabis in California. Id.; see also California Proposition 64, Mari-
juana Legalization (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Califor-
nia_Proposition_64,_Marijuana_Legalization_(2016) [https://perma.cc/3TVD-
QKKW] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
123. Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 178 (introducing the
petitioner’s business structure).  “California laws decriminalizing medical mari-
juana specifically stated that they did not ‘authorize any individual or group to
cultivate or distribute cannabis for profit.’” Id. at 178 n.8 (quoting CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.765(a) (West 2007)).  Harborside’s bylaws required it to use
any excess revenue for the benefit of the community and its patients. Id. at 182.
To that end, Harborside provided free therapeutic services such as reiki and acu-
puncture, as well as group classes in yoga, tai chi, and the Alexander technique.
Id.  Patients were not required to buy marijuana to use the services. Id.
124. Id. at 182 n.7 (noting marijuana companies cannot qualify as tax-exempt
entities under federal law).  Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ex-
empts charitable organizations from federal income tax. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(2018).  Nevertheless, the IRS has determined that charities cannot be created for
illegal purposes. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (determining that criminal
enterprises cannot obtain federal tax-exempt status).  Because medical marijuana
is regarded as a criminal enterprise under federal law, Harborside’s nonprofit sta-
tus is not recognized for federal tax purposes. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective
Corp., 151 T.C. at 182 n.7.
125. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 184 (detailing the
nearly $11 million in deficiencies plus accuracy-related penalties the IRS asserted
in 2012).  The accuracy-related penalties were dismissed in a separate ruling by the
17
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clude deductions for ordinary and necessary businesses expenses because
Harborside operated legally under California law and therefore was not
“trafficking.”126  In the alternative, Harborside argued that it should be
recognized as a producer rather than a reseller, so that it can capitalize its
indirect costs and exclude those costs from its gross receipts under
COGS.127
The court acknowledged that in Olive it held that a marijuana com-
pany operating legally under state law was still “trafficking” under section
280E.128  Nevertheless, the court addressed Harborside’s novel argument
that the words “consists of” immediately preceding “trafficking” in section
280E suggests that only businesses that exclusively traffic controlled sub-
stances are subject to the provision, and those that engage in other legal
business activities are exempt.129  Considering various principles of statu-
tory interpretation, the court analyzed dictionary definitions, other tax
code provisions, and case law before ultimately rejecting Harborside’s in-
terpretation, concluding Harborside’s use of “consists of” as an exhaustive
list would “render section 280E ineffective and absurd.”130  Harborside
also argued there is interplay between literal meaning and statutory pur-
United States Tax Court. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r,
Nos. 29212-11, 30851-12, 14776-14, 2018 WL 6720665, at *2 (T.C. Dec. 20, 2018)
(finding Harborside acted with reasonable cause and in good faith when taking its
tax positions in years 2007 through 2012).
126. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 190–98 (analyzing
petitioner’s arguments regarding meaning of “trafficking” under section 280E).
127. See generally id. at 204–13 (analyzing petitioner’s arguments regarding its
status as manufacturer as opposed to solely retail operation).  Harborside also
sought CHAMP tax treatment for the portions of its business that were non-mari-
juana related. Id. at 198 (citing Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems,
Inc. v. Comm’r (CHAMP), 128 T.C. 173, 184–85 (2007); Olive v. Comm’r, 792 F.3d
1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2015)).  The court, however, found Harborside to be more
like the dispensary in Olive, where non-marijuana services were incidental, and
therefore Harborside did not constitute separate trades or businesses under
CHAMP. See id. at 202.  Whereas eighteen of CHAMP’s twenty-five employees ex-
clusively provided caregiving services, Harborside paid independent contractors
less than 1% of its sales revenue to lead therapeutic sessions and classes. Compare
id. at 202–03, with CHAMP, 128 T.C. at 185.
128. Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 191 (emphasizing Olive
decision rejecting petitioner’s argument for 280E exemption).
129. Id. at 190–91 (analyzing whether “consists of” in section 280E introduces
non-exhaustive list).
130. See id. at 190–98.  The court considered Harborside’s arguments about
the ordinary meaning of “consists of.” See id. at 191.  The court’s opinion cited
several secondary sources that Harborside included in its brief, including: Antonin
Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
(contrasting “includes,” which sets off a non-exhaustive list, with “consists of” or
“comprises,” each of which generally introduces an exhaustive list) and BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (explaining that “consisting” “is not synonymous with ‘including’”
because “including,” when used in connection with a number of specified objects,
always connotes incompleteness). See id.  Ultimately, the court was more per-
suaded by another fundamental canon of statutory construction: to “prefer textu-
ally permissible readings that don’t render a statute ineffective.” Id. at 192.
Harborside’s reading of section 280E would produce an absurd scenario where a
18
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pose, but the court gave deference to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Olive,
which addressed the same arguments a few years earlier.131
Lastly, the court considered Harborside’s contention that it was not
merely a reseller, but actually a producer.132  The court found that
Harborside was a reseller when it sold marijuana edibles and non-mari-
juana products it purchased from third parties.133  The question is more
complex with regard to the marijuana bud Harborside sold.134  In its anal-
ysis, the court cited a Ninth Circuit case that held that a “producer” retains
title to items throughout the contract-production process.135  Although
Harborside bought marijuana only from its members who “used Harbor-
side’s clones . . . , took Harborside’s growing class, followed Harborside’s
best practices, and met Harborside’s quality-control standards,” growers
who used Harborside’s clones had no obligation to sell buds that the
clones produced back to Harborside, and Harborside had no ownership
interest in the marijuana plants after the clones left their possession.136
drug dealer could circumvent the provision by selling any single item that was not
a controlled substance, such as a lighter or rolling papers. See id.
131. See id. at 207–08 (describing statutory difference between producer and
reseller).  Harborside reminded the court that state-sanctioned marijuana dispen-
saries did not exist in 1982 when Congress enacted section 280E. See id.  In fact,
since 2015, Congress has prohibited the Department of Justice from prosecuting
marijuana dispensaries operating legally under state law. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res.
31, 116th Cong. § 537 (2019) (enacted); H.R. Con. Res. 1625, 115th Cong. § 538
(2018) (enacted); H.R. Con. Res. 244, 115th Cong. § 537 (2017) (enacted) (“None
of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used
. . . to prevent any [state] from implementing their own laws that authorize the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” (emphasis added)).  The
Ninth Circuit addressed this same argument in Olive and held that enforcing sec-
tion 280E as a tax does not change whether the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of marijuana is authorized in the states. See Olive, 792 F.3d at 1151
(holding section 280E did not violate Consolidated Appropriations Act).
132. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 206.  Different rules
apply to resellers and producers when determining what to include in COGS.
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(b) (as amended in 2018) (applying to merchandise
purchased and resold by the taxpayer), with § 1.471-3(c) (applying to merchandise
produced by the taxpayer).  For a further discussion of the differences between
resellers and producers, see supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
133. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 210.
134. For a further discussion of Harborside’s labor in preparing marijuana
buds for sale, see infra note 137.
135. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 211–12 (examining
precedent for the meaning of “produce” versus “manufacture”).  “The only re-
quirement for being a ‘producer’ . . . is that the taxpayer be ‘considered an owner
of the property produced’ . . . .  A taxpayer can be a ‘producer’ . . . even if it uses
contract manufacturers to do the actual production.” Id. at 211 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Suzy’s Zoo v. Comm’r, 273 F.3d 875, 880 (9th Cir.
2001)).
136. Id. at 179, 212–13 (analyzing petitioner’s practices for acquiring mari-
juana).  “Clones are cuttings from a female cannabis plant that can be trans-
planted and used to cultivate marijuana.” Id. at 179.
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Therefore, the court held that Harborside is a reseller, rather than a pro-
ducer, for the purposes of calculating COGS under IRC section 471.137
B. Northern California Small Business Assistants, Inc. v. Commissioner
Within a year of the Harborside decision, another marijuana dispensary
challenged a $1.2 million tax deficiency.138  The petitioner asserted sec-
tion 280E “imposes a gross receipts tax as a penalty in violation of the
Eighth Amendment” by disallowing all deductions and should therefore
be invalidated.139  The majority rejected the petitioner’s argument and
instead reinforced that deductions are acts of legislative grace, which Con-
gress is free to grant, restrict, and deny at its discretion.140  The court cited
numerous cases where the denial of a deduction did not violate the Eighth
Amendment and reiterated that section 280E had never been considered
a penalty in its forty-year history.141  Thus, the majority held that the peti-
137. Id. at 213.  Harborside has appealed this issue to the Ninth Circuit. See
generally Opening Brief for Appellant, Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v.
Comm’r, No. 19-73078 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020).  In its Opening Brief, Harborside
analogizes itself to a grocery store butcher who prepares cuts of meat and packages
them before they reach the retail floor. Id. at 60.  Harborside had an extensive
procurement process whereby dedicated employees sourced marijuana clones,
flowers, marijuana-containing products, and non-marijuana containing products.
See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 179 (detailing Harborside’s
inventory acquisition process).  At least four employees spent all of their time
purchasing and caring for the clones. Id.  More than eight employees procured,
inspected, and readied the bulk marijuana flowers for sale. Id. at 180.  Harborside
was selective about the marijuana flowers it purchased, ensured they contained the
right “cannabinoid profile,” and inspected the buds for pathogenic mold. See id.
Harborside sent marijuana samples to a third-party laboratory for testing, and if all
went well, the marijuana was reinspected, manicured, and trimmed, and then
weighed, packaged, and labeled before it reached the retail floor. Id.
138. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 65–66
(2019) (challenging section 280E on constitutional grounds).
139. Id. at 66–67.  The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The petitioner also argued that because it oper-
ates a medical marijuana dispensary legally under California law, its business does
not consist of “trafficking” a controlled substance within the meaning of section
280E. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 72.  The majority rejected
the argument, citing many holdings to the contrary. See, e.g., Olive v. Comm’r, 139
T.C. 19, 38 (2012); Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v.
Comm’r (CHAMP), 128 T.C. 173, 182–83 (2007) (finding trafficking within the
scope of section 280E to include sale of medical marijuana).
140. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 69–70.  “Deductions from
gross income do not turn on equitable considerations; rather they are pure acts of
legislative grace, the prudence of which is left to Congress.” Id.
141. Id. at 71–72 (first citing Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United States, 894
F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2018); then citing Murillo v. Comm’r, No. 18163-96,
1998 WL 6462, at *3 (T.C. Jan. 12, 1998); and then citing Bermingham v. Comm’r,
No. 24897-90, 1994 WL 52352, at *12 (T.C. Feb. 23, 1994); King v. United States,
949 F. Supp. 787, 791 (E.D. Wash. 1996)) (holding that denial of deductions
under section 280E not penalty under Eighth Amendment).
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tioner’s inability to deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses did
not violate the Eighth Amendment.142
In contrast, two dissenting opinions illustrated how the constitutional-
ity of section 280E is still in question.143  Judge Gustafson began a lengthy
dissent by considering the meaning of “income” under the Sixteenth
Amendment.144  Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that
“income” must exclude COGS because return of capital shall not be
taxed.145  But Judge Gustafson’s dissent went further, emphasizing that
“income” means gain, and that ordinary and necessary expenses must be
accounted for before one can be said to have gain.146  In Judge Gustaf-
son’s eyes, section 280E results in a tax on something other than “income”
because it prohibits marijuana companies from deducting any expense be-
sides COGS.147  As support, Judge Gustafson cited Davis, a Second Circuit
142. N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 71–72.
143. See id. at 77–90 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (concluding that taxing in-
come where there is no gain violates Sixteenth Amendment); see also id. at 90–94
(Copeland, J., dissenting) (concluding that section 280E is a penalty that raises
Eighth Amendment concerns).
144. See id. at 77 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).  The Sixteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to tax incomes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
145. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 65 (recognizing distinc-
tion between return of capital and gross income).  For a discussion of return of
capital versus gross income that was established in Doyle, see supra notes 67–69 and
accompanying text.
146. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 80–81 (Gustafson, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that income without gain must not be taxed).  “Income may
be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.”
Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 206–07 (1920)).
147. See id. at 77–90 (explaining why section 280E results in inaccurate mea-
sure of income).  Judge Gustafson illustrated why “income” must account for a
taxpayer’s cost of goods sold:
A taxpayer who purchased 100 widgets at a cost of $10 each and sold
them at a price of $9 each would have gross receipts or sales of $900,
which after being reduced by the “cost of goods sold” . . . of $1,000 . . .
would yield a loss of $100.  Given that obvious loss, Congress could not
tax the gross receipts of $900 as if it were “income.”
Id. at 80.  Judge Gustafson then changed the facts of the hypothetical to demon-
strate how section 280E’s prohibition of all deductions fabricates gain where there
may not be any:
Suppose he purchased 100 widgets at a cost of $6 per widget . . . and
suppose that for his business he leased a retail space for $200 and paid
wages of $200 to employees, yielding additional expenses of $400, so that
his out-of-pocket expenditures for COGS ($600) and additional expenses
($400) totaled $1,000.  If he then sold the 100 widgets at a price of $9
each . . . after being reduced by his total costs of $1,000 (the sum of
COGS and total expenses), [he would] yield a loss of $100.  No one
would propose that this seller had any gain.  And if his product had been
. . . illegal drugs costing the same amount, he would have the same . . .
loss of $100.  But despite this obvious loss, section 280E would disallow
any deduction for his rent and wage expenses totaling $400, leaving him
with gross receipts of $900, less COGS . . . yielding a supposed taxable
“income” of $300—despite his having incurred not gain but loss.
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decision that distinguished necessary expenses, which are “inherently nec-
essary as a matter of computation to arrive at income,” from deductions of
another sort that Congress has allowed as a matter of legislative grace.148
Despite Alpenglow, which arguably contradicts his assertions, Judge Gustaf-
son maintained that gain is an “indispensable ingredient of income.”149
Judge Gustafson further observed that “[e]ven if deductions are a
matter of legislative grace, the disallowance of deductions must pass mus-
ter . . . under all other constitutional standards.”150  To that end, Judge
Gustafson analyzed the Eighth Amendment and maintained that section
280E results in a “fine” under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause.151  Judge Gustafson acknowledged that before the petitioner
could prevail, the court would have to also determine whether the Eighth
Id. at 83.
148. Id. at 82 (citing Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (1937)).  For a further
discussion of Davis, see supra note 61–63 and accompanying text.
149. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 82 (Gustafson, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting Davis is still persuasive despite contrary holding in Alpenglow).  For
a further discussion of Alpenglow, see supra notes 105–15 and accompanying text.
Judge Gustafson conceded the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Alpenglow set the Second
Circuit’s Davis decision aside as dicta and noted that the Supreme Court in Glen-
shaw Glass Co. held that Eisner “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future
gross income questions.” See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 82 (Gus-
tafson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comm’r v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)).  Nevertheless, Judge Gustafson as-
serted that the court’s findings in Alpenglow are unpersuasive because the court
relied on a prior opinion that only addressed whether, under the Anti-Injunction
Act, the IRS could be enjoined from investigating whether the petitioner was traf-
ficking in a controlled substance, which, if true, would invalidate its deductions
under section 280E. See id.  The Tenth Circuit did not address whether section
280E fails as a penalty under the Eighth Amendment in Alpenglow. See id. at 89.
150. Id. at 85.  Congress would clearly violate constitutional provisions if, for
example, Congress allowed tax exemptions for one religious organization but de-
nied them for another. See, e.g., Golden Rule Church Ass’n v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.
719, 729 (1964) (first citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272–73 (1951);
then citing Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953)) (noting that discrimi-
nating between religious organizations violates First Amendment).  Similarly, it
would be unconstitutional if individuals of one sex were allowed deductions, but
those same deductions were denied to individuals of another sex. See, e.g., Moritz
v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[I]f the Congress determines to
grant deductions of a general type, a denial of them to a particular class may not
be based on an invidious discrimination.”).
151. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 85–90 (Gustafson, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that application of section 280E results in a fine, which
may be prohibited under Eighth Amendment).  The Eighth Amendment provides,
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).  Judge
Gustafson’s argument is supported by a second dissenting opinion by Judge Cope-
land, which asserted that, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, “fines” are
“payments ‘to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.’” See N. Cal. Small Bus.
Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 91 (Copeland, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998)).
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Amendment extends to corporate taxpayers and whether the section 280E
penalty is “excessive.”152
Judge Copeland’s dissent emphasized that the intent of section
280E’s prohibition on deductions was to punish drug traffickers.153  Judge
Copeland argued that a tax loses its character and becomes a sheer pen-
alty “with the characteristics of regulation and punishment” when imposed
to influence conduct.154  Judge Copeland characterized section 280E as a
penalty provision because it operates to deter marijuana sales by broadly
denying every deduction that would otherwise be allowed.155  Judge Cope-
land finished by stating Congress cannot evade the Eighth Amendment
simply by labeling something a tax.156
IV. DELVING INTO THE WEEDS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 280E
The Tax Court’s consistency in upholding section 280E should not
warrant a hasty conclusion that section 280E is beyond reproach.157  On
the contrary, section 280E masquerades as a mere tax, but given a closer
look at the provision’s effect, it becomes clear section 280E is, in fact, a
penalty.158  Moreover, by taxing marijuana companies on gross income
rather than net income, section 280E blatantly ignores the ability-to-pay
principle, which is one of the longest standing pillars of a just and equita-
ble tax system.159  Since section 280E was enacted, public opinion has
shifted to favor marijuana, and a majority of states have legalized medici-
nal marijuana.160  In states where medicinal or recreational marijuana is
152. Id. at 90 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing need for further pro-
ceedings to address outstanding questions relating to case).
153. See id. at 91–93 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 92 (quoting Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1992))
(examining threshold between tax and penalty).  Similarly, Judge Gustafson cited
the Supreme Court, noting “if the concept of penalty means anything, it means
punishment for an unlawful act or omission.” Id. at 87 (Gustafson, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebe-
lius, 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012)).
155. See id. at 93 (Copeland, J., dissenting) (describing section 280E as puni-
tive in its sweeping application to all deductions).
156. See id. at 92 (citing Bailey, 259 U.S. at 37) (holding exaction for employ-
ment of minor children, which was labeled tax, functioned as penalty).
157. See, e.g., id. at 93 (“Section 280E is punitive and requires further analysis
under the Eighth Amendment.”).
158. See id. (“[E]ven if section 280E was not written as a penalty provision, it
operates as such.”).  For a further discussion of how section 280E operates as a
penalty, see supra notes 138–56 and accompanying text.
159. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 243. (“To many persons ability to pay is
synonymous with justice in taxation.”).  For a further discussion of the ability-to-pay
principle, see supra notes 26–43 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion
on how section 280E specifically frustrates the ability-to-pay principle, see infra
notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 184–85 for supporting data.
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legal, dispensaries provide many economic and social benefits.161  To pre-
serve these benefits, harmful legislation like section 280E must be re-
pealed or amended; otherwise, medical marijuana companies may be
forced to close up shop and go underground.162
A. Blunt Trauma: Section 280E Undeniably Penalizes Marijuana Companies
Although section 280E was intended to deter drug trafficking, its ap-
plication results in something that resembles a punishment more than a
tax.163  The Tax Equity and Responsibility Act of 1982, which promulgated
section 280E, plainly identifies public policy against drug trafficking as the
driving force behind the provision.164  Reflecting this legislative intent,
the provision does not seek to merely levy a tax on drug traffickers, rather,
it strives to bolster the war on drugs and serve as a weapon in the govern-
ment’s arsenal.165
Under the guise of a tax, section 280E punishes marijuana companies
by levying a high tax burden based on gross income, diminishing profits,
and making it more difficult to remain in business.166  Section 280E en-
ables the IRS to disallow deduction after deduction from marijuana com-
pany tax returns.167  Research suggests the IRS singles out marijuana
companies, which are over five times more likely to be audited than other
businesses.168  Congress, the IRS, and the courts have all ignored the fact
that taxing a business on gross income without taking into account ordi-
161. See, e.g., How Do Marijuana Taxes Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-marijuana-taxes-work [https://
perma.cc/2XKS-LY94] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (explaining how different states
tax recreational marijuana).  For a further discussion of how marijuana companies
benefit the states and communities in which they operate, see infra notes 188–99
and accompanying text.
162. See Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 335–36.
163. See id. at 335 (explaining how section 280E was enacted specifically to
punish criminals who illegally buy and sell drugs because of link between drugs
and violence); see also N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 92–93 (2019)
(Copeland, J., dissenting) (characterizing section 280E as penalty disguised as tax).
164. See S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309 (1982) (showing connectivity between sec-
tion 280E and drug deterrence).
165. See generally Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 324–25 (contextualizing section
280E’s enactment during war on drugs).
166. See id.
167. See I.R.C. § 280E (2018).
168. See Becky Olson, Chart of the Week: IRS Audit Rate for Existing Marijuana
Businesses, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (June 15, 2015), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-of-
the-week-irs-audit-rate-for-existing-marijuana-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/
3CMM-35XT].  The IRS audited about 1.4% of all United States businesses in
2014. Id.  Yet, surveys show that marijuana retail businesses have an 8% chance of
being audited. Id.  The likelihood of a business being audited fluctuates based on
a number of factors such as corporate structure, gross income, and the nature of
the business. Id.  Marijuana business owners are being audited at the same rate of
frequency as some of America’s largest corporations with over $100 million in as-
sets. See id.
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nary and necessary business expenses does not accurately reflect the busi-
ness’s profits.169
Rather than remedying this disparity, the Supreme Court declined to
rule on the issue, instead punting the issue back to Congress to decide
whether to bestow its “legislative grace” upon marijuana companies to al-
low deductions.170  The Court could have addressed whether deductions
that are mathematically necessary for taxpayers to compute their actual
income are distinguishable from deductions that, by legislative grace,
grant taxpayers a felicitous tax break.171
Judge Gustafson’s dissent in North California Small Business Assistants,
Inc. breaks the judicial silence on the matter and posits that the penalty
section 280E doles out is not the disallowance of deductions per se.172
Rather, the penalty is the oppressive tax burden that results from the disal-
lowance.173  Take Harborside, for example: in 2007, Harborside operated
at a loss of $26,407.174  Yet, Harborside was liable for $628,516 in federal
income tax because the IRS asserted that its ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses were disallowed under section 280E.175  Foisting a hefty tax
burden on a marijuana company that operated at a financial loss illus-
trates section 280E’s penalizing effect.176
169. See, e.g., N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 77–84
(2019) (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress taxes something other
than “income” under section 280E).
170. See Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (“If we enforce as federal
policy the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we would come close to
making this type of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all
other business would be taxable on the basis of net income.  If that choice is to be
made, Congress should do it.”).
171. See Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 324–25 (2d Cir. 1937) (distin-
guishing computational deductions from other deductions).  Before Congress en-
acted the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act , taxpayers could claim personal tax
exemptions for themselves and their dependents. See What Are Personal Exemp-
tions?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-
personal-exemptions [https://perma.cc/6Q2S-UN6X] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
The exemption reduced the amount of taxes a taxpayer owed, and personal ex-
emptions were especially beneficial to families with more dependents. See id.  Per-
sonal exemptions are distinguishable from deductions from gross income because
personal exemptions are unrelated to the activities that resulted in income,
whereas ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162 can be di-
rectly attributed to the taxpayer’s earned income. See id; see also I.R.C. § 162(a).
172. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 88 (Gustafson, J.,
dissenting).
173. See id. (declaring aspect of section 280E that makes it penalty); see also id.
at 90–93 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
174. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 137, at 28.
175. See id.
176. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 92–93 (Copeland, J.,
dissenting).  “A ‘penalty’ is a ‘punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, im-
posed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws.” Id. at 91
n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017)).
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B. Up in Smoke: Taxing Income Absent Gain Causes Ability-To-Pay Burnout
By prohibiting ordinary and necessary expense deductions by mari-
juana companies, the tax code frustrates the long-standing principle that
taxes should reflect the taxpayer’s ability to pay.177  To accurately re-
present a taxpayer’s ability to pay, tax must be measured by net income,
which takes into account deductions for business expenses.178  Section
280E taxes marijuana companies on their gross income rather than their
net income by forbidding them from taking deductions.179
Although Congress has lawfully disallowed deductions for certain ex-
penditures such as bribe payments and traffic tickets, section 280E does
not merely disallow some deductions; it sweepingly disallows all deductions,
which can result in a tax bill that exceeds a company’s actual profits.180
What’s more egregious is that a marijuana company operating at a loss can
face an enormous tax bill, where other profitless non-marijuana businesses
would not have income tax and can even carry forward losses to offset
income in future years.181  By taxing the marijuana company’s gross in-
come, Congress taxes the company on an inflated representation of the
company’s gain, ignoring the ability-to-pay principle.182  Consequently,
marijuana companies are forced to somehow find a way to pay their taxes
during unprofitable years, or else become extinguished.183
177. See Frank M. Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 UCLA L.
REV. 26, 35 (1958) (discussing how disallowing deductions for illegal items frus-
trates ability-to-pay principle as matter of public policy).
178. See id. (asserting that net income is the only accurate way to measure
taxpayer’s ability to pay, rather than gross income).
179. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 84 (Gustafson, J.,
dissenting).
180. See I.R.C. § 280E (2018) (declaring “no deduction” whatsoever for a
trade or business engaged in trafficking in controlled substances as is prohibited
by federal law).
181. See James V. Baker, IRS War on Cannabis Companies Must End, SEEKING
ALPHA (July 8, 2020, 8:07 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4357511-irs-war-
on-cannabis-companies-must-end [https://perma.cc/KH6K-ST3X] (reporting
losses sustained by marijuana companies due to section 280E).  Harborside is not
the only marijuana company to have income tax in a year when it operated at a
loss. See id.  Five of the largest multi-state-operating marijuana companies faced
net losses but were taxed as having net gains. Id.
Curaleaf lost $45.8 million but had a current tax of $17.1 million, Green
Thumb lost $50.2 million but had a current tax of $22.8 million, Cresco
lost $50.8 million but had a current tax of $13.3, Harvest Health lost
$171.8 million but had a current tax of $5.7 [million], and MedMen lost
$263.2 million but had a current tax liability of $18.8 million.
Id. (citations omitted).
182. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 83–84 (Gustafson, J.,
dissenting) (“Section 280E would fabricate gain where there was none and would
impose a tax based on artificial income.”).
183. See Baker, supra note 181 (explaining how marijuana companies sustain
exorbitant losses due to section 280E).  Marijuana companies who carry a sizeable
tax balance must either sell assets, borrow money, or issue stock to pay their taxes.
See id.
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C. Flower to the People: Congress Should Amend Section 280E in Light of
Widespread State Legalization
Congress should tune into recent societal attitude changes regarding
marijuana usage and eliminate the harm that section 280E causes to states
where recreational and medical marijuana is legal.  Congress never
imagined a legalized marijuana industry when it enacted section 280E in
1982, and undeniably, the public opinion of marijuana has radically
shifted since then.184  State legislatures have responded to this shift in
opinion, and now medical marijuana is legal in thirty-nine states and the
District of Columbia, and fifteen of those jurisdictions also permit the sale
of recreational marijuana.185  Today, marijuana is an ever-growing indus-
try that creates jobs and generates a significant amount of state tax reve-
184. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Cannabis Indus. Ass’n Supporting Ap-
pellant in Favor of Reversal at 5, Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v.
Comm’r, No. 19-73078 (9th Cir. June 2, 2020) (providing evidence that Americans
favor marijuana legalization).  “Recent polling reveals that 93% of Americans favor
legalizing medical marijuana for public use, and 63% support legalization for non-
medical use.” Id. (citing Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, U.S. Voters Believe Comey More than
Trump, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Support for Marijuana Hits New High
2 (Apr. 26, 2018), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2539
[https://perma.cc/2F5J-G9RF]).  In the 1980s, only 25% of Americans supported
marijuana legalization. See Liam McKillop, Comment, Pass the Revenue: How Section
280E Is Harming the Medical Marijuana Industry, 2 INT’L COMP., POL’Y & ETHICS L.
REV. 849, 868 (2019) (providing historical data on public perception of
marijuana).
185. See Map of Marijuana Legality by State, DISA GLOB. SOLS., https://
disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state [https://perma.cc/72MZ-WCMJ] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2020).  During the Obama presidency, the Department of Justice
even issued memoranda directing federal prosecutors to deprioritize enforcement
of federal marijuana laws in states where marijuana was legal. See Nikola Vujcic,
Note, Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code and Medical Marijuana Dispensaries: An
Interpretation Based on Statutory Purpose, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 249, 263 (2016)
(describing actions taken by federal agencies to stop prosecution of marijuana
businesses).  The first memorandum was issued in 2009 by David W. Ogden, and
the second was issued in 2013 by James M. Cole. See id. at 262–63 (first citing
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Selected U.S. At-
torneys 1 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/
2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA4P-EZJB]; then citing
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys 1
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275685
7467.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2JL-AYC3]).
During the Trump administration, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions re-
pealed these memoranda. See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attor-
ney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/8T4V-ST5K] (striking Ogden
and Cole memoranda).  Nevertheless, more states have since legalized marijuana,
and citizens have demonstrated support for the cannabis industry through a steady
increase in sales since 2016. See KACEY MORRISSEY ET AL., NEW FRONTIER DATA, THE
U.S. CANNABIS REPORT 2019 INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 8 (2019), https://equio.new-
frontierdata.com/reports [permalink unavailable] (providing market data on ma-
rijuana industry).  Since 2016, legal marijuana sales have seen a steady 16% or
more increase year-to-year. Id. at 7.
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nue.186  The continued enforcement of section 280E against marijuana
companies operating legitimately under state law incentivizes those com-
panies to go underground and jeopardizes the societal benefits resulting
from the legal marijuana industry.187
1. Jackpot: Legal Marijuana Provides Considerable Societal Benefits
The legal marijuana industry provides jobs, tax revenue, and high-
quality alternative medicines to chronically ill patients.188  Early in 2020,
over 243,000 individuals were employed full-time by the marijuana indus-
try, representing a 15% growth rate since 2019.189  Even more impressive
is the marijuana industry’s 100% job growth rate between 2016 and 2020,
a feat practically unheard of in other industries.190  Researchers believe
that if all fifty states legalized marijuana, the industry would generate 1.63
million jobs by 2025.191
The marijuana industry is a major source of revenue in states that
have legalized marijuana.192  Excise and sales taxes on marijuana raised
186. See infra Section IV C.1.
187. See infra Section IV C.2.
188. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 184, at 6.  “[M]arijuana provides
relief to patients suffering from ‘cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity,
glaucoma, arthritis [and] migrane[s].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a)(b)(1)(A) (West 2007)); see also Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Introduction to a Debate: ‘Marijuana: Legalize, Decriminalize, or Leave the
Status Quo in Place?,’ 23 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 72, 74–75 (2018) (describing medical
uses of marijuana).
189. See Bruce Barcott et al., Cannabis Jobs Report: Legal Cannabis Now Supports
243,700 Full-Time American Jobs, LEAFLY (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.leafly.com/
news/industry/243700-marijuana-jobs-how-many-in-america [https://perma.cc/
ZQ9N-SXZ7].
190. See BRUCE BARCOTT ET AL., LEAFLY, LEAFLY JOBS REPORT 2020 3 (2020),
https://leafly-images.imgix.net/Leafly-2020-Jobs-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
47RA-YL46].  “Massachusetts now has more legal cannabis workers than hair stylists
and cosmetologists.  Nevada has as many cannabis workers as bartenders.  Illinois
has twice as many cannabis workers as meat packers.” Id.
191. U.S. Federal Cannabis Legalization Could Be Worth $128.8 Billion in Taxes
and 1.6 Million Jobs, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 2, 2019, 10:32 AM), https://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191002005609/en/U.S.-Federal-Cannabis-
Legalization-Worth-128.8-Billion [https://perma.cc/5QRC-GADA].
192. See generally Carl Davis, State and Local Cannabis Tax Revenue Jumps 33%,
Surpassing $1.9 Billion in 2019, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://itep.org/state-and-local-cannabis-tax-revenue-jumps-33-surpassing-1-9-bil-
lion-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/5SAD-WCP2] (reporting tax revenue from eight
states that legalized sale of marijuana surpassed $1.9 billion); see also Kenneth W.
Boyd, Deep Dive: Recreational Marijuana Tax Revenue in the United States, CPA ACCT.
INST. FOR SUCCESS, https://www.ais-cpa.com/deep-dive-recreational-marijuana-tax-
revenue-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/VJ2J-VRF2] (last visited Mar. 31,
2021) (reporting tax revenue data from recreational marijuana in eleven states);
see also Marijuana Taxes, URB. INST., https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-
center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/
marijuana-taxes [https://perma.cc/L2YZ-YYGV] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (com-
paring various state tax systems for marijuana taxes).
28
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over $1.9 billion in 2019, even without accounting for other revenue
streams such as income taxes and license fees that states also collect from
marijuana business owners.193  In a number of states, marijuana excise
and sales tax revenues are equal to or in excess of revenues from similar
taxes on alcohol.194  States use marijuana tax revenue to fund public assis-
tance programs for education, substance abuse, criminal justice reform,
and health care.195
In addition to supporting communities at-large, legalized marijuana
helps over 2.3 million medical marijuana patients in the United States.196
Although the FDA has not yet issued a ruling on the safety and efficacy of
medical marijuana, extensive clinical research supports the use of mari-
juana as an effective treatment for a number of conditions.197  Medical
marijuana can relieve symptoms of patients with conditions such as can-
cer, nausea, epilepsy, HIV/AIDS, and glaucoma.198  State-regulated mari-
juana businesses are subject to strict testing, labeling, and packaging
standards, which ensures that both medical marijuana patients and recrea-
tional users obtain high-quality, safe products.199  Excluding legally oper-
ating marijuana companies from section 280E will help preserve these
societal benefits.
2. Under Section 280E, Underground Drug Trafficking Grows Like a Weed,
While Legitimate Business Goes to Pot
Marijuana legalization attempts to redirect income from illegal drug
dealers and direct it to legitimate business owners.200  In contrast, section
193. See Davis, supra note 192.
194. See CARL DAVIS ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, TAXING CAN-
NABIS 20–22 (2019), https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/012319-TaxingCan-
nabis_ITEP_DavisHillPhillips.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ48-EJNR] (comparing
marijuana excise tax revenue to other excise taxes).  Excise taxes on alcohol, to-
bacco, and marijuana are referred to as “sin taxes.” Id. at 20.  Excise taxes on
tobacco generate the largest “sin tax” revenue in all states, except Colorado. Id. at
21.  In Colorado, excise taxes on marijuana surpassed excise taxes on tobacco. Id.
195. See How Do Marijuana Taxes Work?, supra note 164 (discussing how states
utilize marijuana tax revenue).  Where marijuana has been legalized recreation-
ally, state and local governments tax marijuana in three ways: as a percentage of
the price, based on weight, and based on the potency of the marijuana. Id.  The
tax laws vary state to state, and Vermont, Maine, and Washington D.C. do not tax
marijuana at all, but do collect income taxes from the marijuana business entities.
See id.; see also DAVIS ET AL., supra note 194, at 15–17.
196. See MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 185, at 18.
197. See Kathleen A. Russell, Caring for Patients Using Medical Marijuana, 10 J.
NURSING REG. 47, 50 (2019) (discussing varied use of medical marijuana in clinical
settings).
198. See id. at 51.  In jurisdictions that permit medical marijuana, more than
sixty qualifying medical conditions are treated with medical marijuana.  Id.
199. See Amicus Brief of Marijuana Indus. Grp. and Cannabis Trade Fed’n
Action in Support of Appellant Supporting Reversal at 9, Patients Mut. Assistance
Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 19-73078 (9th Cir. June 2, 2020) (citing California
and Colorado marijuana regulations).
200. See Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 335.
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280E hinders the legal marijuana industry from doing just that.201  The
Tax Court acknowledged that section 280E “make[s] it more costly to run
a dispensary.”202  State-legal marijuana businesses are punished by the
IRS’ application of section 280E, while black market drug dealers often
evade paying income tax altogether to avoid detection of their illegal
trafficking.203
By penalizing businesses that traffic controlled substances, section
280E attempts to suppress the supply of drugs, but it does nothing to elimi-
nate the demand for drugs.204  Americans spend billions of dollars per year
on legal marijuana products.205  Consumer demand for marijuana will not
simply vanish if legitimate marijuana companies are taxed out of business
by section 280E.  Instead, consumers will turn to unregulated street deal-
ers and strengthen the very criminal enterprises that the government in-
tended to eradicate.206  Amending section 280E to exclude legally
operating marijuana companies will support states’ efforts to eradicate ille-
gal drug trafficking.207
201. See id. (discussing how section 280E impedes states from reducing illegal
drug trade).
202. Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 197
(2018) (quoting Olive v. Comm’r, 793 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2015)).
203. See Keller, supra note 50, at 177 (arguing that section 280E impacts legiti-
mate businesses more than it does illegal drug dealers).
204. See id. at 172–73.  In the 1960s and 1970s, drug policy in the United
States was created to suppress the supply of drugs, but policy focus has since
shifted to suppress demand. Id. (citing Peter H. Smith, The Political Economy of
Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 6 (Peter
H. Smith ed., 1992).  Section 280E, which was enacted in 1982 when the govern-
ment was focused on suppressing drug supply, “no longer has an effective role in
the American drug initiative.”  Keller, supra note 50, at 173.
205. See MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 185, at 7.  Combined, recreational and
medical marijuana sales were $7.9 billion in 2017 and rose to $10.3 billion in 2018.
Id.  It is estimated that marijuana sales will steadily grow at a rate of approximately
16%. Id.  Researchers project that sales will reach $29.7 billion in 2025. Id.  To put
these numbers into perspective, the NFL generates approximately $15 billion in
annual revenue. See Eli McVey, Chart: Retail Marijuana Sales Surpass Fortnite Video
Game, Closing in on Taco Bell, NFL, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (June 4, 2019), https://
mjbizdaily.com/retail-marijuana-sales-rival-taco-bell-nfl/ [https://perma.cc/E9GE-
Z9X7].
206. See Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 335–36.  “The courts’ application of
280E to the legal marijuana industry hinders [a] market takeover [by the legal
marijuana industry] because legal marijuana ‘stores that might not even be profita-
ble can end up being taxed out of business,’ basically dooming the legal marijuana
industry while protecting drug dealers.” Id. at 335 (quoting Ariel Shearer, IRS
Targets Medical Marijuana Businesses in Government’s Ongoing War on Pot, HUF-
FINGTON POST (May 29, 2013, 12:01 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/irs-
medical-marijuana_n_3346801 [https://perma.cc/Z2GG-K4Q8]).
207. See id. at 335.
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V. REEFER GLADNESS OR REEFER MADNESS: SECTION 280E RISKS LEAVING
STATES HIGH AND DRY
If section 280E is not repealed, or at least amended to exclude legal
marijuana companies, states may see a decrease in the number of dispen-
saries because exorbitant federal taxes makes yielding a profit much more
difficult than other enterprises.208  According to one of the leading publi-
cations for the marijuana industry, section 280E is the greatest threat to
marijuana businesses and could force many in the industry, growers and
retailers alike, to close completely or move underground.209  As dispensa-
ries close, states will see a sharp decline in tax revenue and a reciprocal
rise in unemployment.210  Shuttered marijuana dispensaries will drive con-
sumers back to the illegal drug marijuana market, which will result in little
tax revenue for state and federal governments.211  After all, drug traffick-
ers have little incentive to accurately report their income to the IRS.212
The public perception of marijuana has dramatically changed since
Congress passed section 280E in 1982.213  Now, marijuana is prescribed to
help patients manage a range of chronic medical conditions.214  If dispen-
saries close, patients who rely on medical marijuana would have fewer op-
tions for obtaining medicinal marijuana products.  With less competition,
208. See generally NAT’L CANNABIS INDUS. ASS’N, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SEC-
TION 280E: CREATING AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION FOR LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES (2015),
https://thecannabisindustry.org/uploads/2015-280E-White-Paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L62N-H9U5] (describing section 280E’s harmful impact on legitimate
marijuana businesses).  Because section 280E disallows all deductions, marijuana
companies pay effective tax rates of 70% or higher. See id.  In 2015, a marijuana
dispensary in Seattle paid nearly 87% of its profits in taxes. See id.; see also Jack
Healy, Legal Marijuana Faces Another Federal Hurdle: Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/us/politics/legal-marijuana-faces-another-
federal-hurdle-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/XVE5-ZJ82].  In contrast, corpora-
tions not subject to section 280E pay an income tax rate of only 21%. See H.R. REP.
NO. 115-466, at 343 (2017) (establishing flat corporate tax rate of 21%).
209. See Marijuana Business Conference Wrapup: 36 Tips, Lessons & Takeaways for
the Cannabis Industry, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Nov. 15, 2012), https://
mjbizdaily.com/marijuana-business-conference-wrapup-36-tips-lessons-take-aways-
for-the-cannabis-industry/ [https://perma.cc/5C9C-YP5H] (noting section 280E is
“looked at as a tax cut for drug dealers” among industry insiders).
210. See, e.g., BARCOTT ET AL., supra note 190 (reporting increase in employ-
ment opportunities as more states legalize marijuana).
211. See Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 335–36 (explaining how legal marijuana
industry can help minimize illegal drug sales).
212. See Keller, supra note 50, at 177 (noting drug dealers do not accurately
report income to IRS).
213. For a further discussion of surveys measuring public support for mari-
juana legalization, see supra note 184.
214. See Russell, supra note 197, at 51 (listing more than sixty qualifying medi-
cal conditions that are treated with medical marijuana in jurisdictions that have
legalized medical marijuana).
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marijuana merchants may take advantage of consumers in a market yield-
ing few options to obtain medical marijuana.215
One must jump through hoops to justify the tax policy behind section
280E.  Section 280E fails to reflect the ability-to-pay principle.216  Regard-
less of Congress’s “legislative grace,” the fact of the matter is that some
marijuana businesses are subject to tax in years where they actually oper-
ated at a loss.217  The effect section 280E has on legitimate marijuana busi-
nesses could not be further from the intent of the ability-to-pay principle.
To preserve the benefits that legalized marijuana provides to states and
citizens alike, and in the name of the long-standing ability-to-pay tax prin-
ciple, Congress should repeal or amend section 280E so legally operating
marijuana companies are taxed like other legitimate businesses: according
to their gains.
215. Cf. 2019 Recreational Marijuana Supply and Demand Legislative Report, OR.
LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N 7 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.oregon.gov/olcc/mari-
juana/Documents/Bulletins/2019%20Supply%20and%20Demand%20Legislative
%20Report%20FINAL%20for%20Publication(PDFA).pdf [https://perma.cc/
YQ2X-93SW] (discussing impact of supply and demand on price of marijuana).
An increased supply of marijuana that outgrew consumer demand resulted in a
price decrease. See id.
216. See I.R.C. § 280E (2018).  For further discussion of the ability-to-pay prin-
ciple, see supra notes 26–43 and accompanying text.
217. For a further discussion of marijuana companies that sustained net losses
but still owed taxes, see supra note 181; see also N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 84 (2019) (discussing restraints of Congress’s “legislative
grace”).
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss2/5
